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which the defendant relied upon to urge an automatic reversal. 75
However, the court rejected defendant's contentions as being
76
without merit, and declined to follow the second department.
The Toliver court's holding carves out a sensible exception to
the first department's previously inflexible rule, as set forth in
Silver, concerning the absence of a trial judge during courtroom
proceedings. 77 Consequently, when a judge impermissibly
absents himself from the courtroom, the first department no
longer adheres to a rule requiring automatic reversal. 78 The
court's ruling is in line with federal case law from the Third
79
Circuit, as well as the laws of other states, such as Texas.
These jurisdictions, and now the first department, hold that the
absence of the trial judge is not a per se grounds for reversal,
that proper grounds for reversal require that the absence must not
be de minimis and the defendant must have suffered harm or
prejudice.

80

SECOND DEPARTMENT
Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the
City of New York v. Deka Realty Corp. 8 1
(decided January 9, 1995)
On appeal, landlord Deka Realty Corp. claimed that, based on
the magnitude of contempt fines and civil penalties imposed
judicial authority and is per se reversible error, regardless of the consent of the
parties).
74. 178 A.D.2d 619, 577 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (2d Dep't 1991) (holding
that "[a] Judge's absence from the courtroom during the reading back of
testimony, with or without consent, is improper; it does not comport with the
judge's supervisory role, or with the established expectations and convictions
that underlie the Judge's function") (citations omitted).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Toliver, 212 A.D.2d at 347, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
Id. at 350, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
See infra notes 83, 94.
See supra notes 45-48.
See supra notes 61-69.
Id.
208 A.D.2d 37, 620 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2d Dep't 1995).
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against it in a nonjury trial ($6.7 million in criminal and civil
contempt penalties and $272,000 in civil fines), it was denied its
constitutional right to a jury trial under the Federal 82 and New
York State 8 3 Constitutions. 8 4 Additionally, Deka claimed that it

had not waived its right to a jury trial by failing to demand
one. 85 Deka argued that the written waiver requirement of article
I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution 8 6 had not

rendered its waiver ineffective. 87 The Appellate Division, Second
Department held that (1) Deka did not have a right to a jury trial
on the issue of the civil and criminal contempt penalties, as the

criminal contempt penalties were not sufficiently "serious" so as
to

invoke constitutional protection and the civil contempt

penalties and civil fines were not shown to be punitive in nature;
and (2) the requirement of a written waiver of the right to a jury
trial under article I, section 2 of the New York Constitution was

not applicable given that the action was not a "criminal
proceeding. "88
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.. .

."

Id.

83. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. This section of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial
may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be
prescribed by law ....

A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in

all criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be
punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in
person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice
of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may
enact laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content,
manner and time of presentation of the instrument effectuating such
waiver.
Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 40, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
Deka, 203 A.D.2d at 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Deka, 203 A.D.2d at 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
Id. The court also considered the following issues:

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/53

2

et al.: Right to a Jury Trial

1996]

JURY TRIAL

1105

Deka had been cited for a number of housing code violations
by the Department of Housing Preservation and Development of
the City of New York (hereinafter HPD). 89 A nonjury trial
ensued in which Deka was deemed to be in civil and criminal
contempt. 90 A total of $3,372,250 in criminal contempt fines,
$3,372,250 in civil contempt fines and $272,645 in civil penalties
were assessed against it. 9 1 On appeal to the appellate term, the
criminal contempt fines were reduced to $1,000, the findings of
civil contempt, fines, and civil penalties were vacated, and the
case was remanded for a jury trial. 92 HPD appealed to the
[W]hether civil contempt fines, assessed for a landlord's failure to
remedy certain housing code violations on its premises, should properly
be distributed to the [Department of Housing] or to those tenants
aggrieved by the existing violations[,] and whether contempt fines may
be assessed, pursuant to a consent decree, based on a multiplication of
individual housing code violations times the maximum statutory
fine ....

Id. at 39-40, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 839. As to the issue of whether the civil
contempt penalties were properly assessed, the court held that the question was
"properly remitted to the Civil Court by the Appellate Term for a hearing on
the issue of actual damages suffered by the tenants." Id. at 45, 620 N.Y.S.2d
at 842.
89. Id. at 40, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The parties had entered into a consent
decree after HPD initiated an action to compel Deka to cure its deficiencies.
Id. When Deka did not comply with a subsequent order which extended the
dates by which the repairs were required to be made, HPD sought to have civil
penalties assessed and punishment imposed in the form of civil and criminal
contempt fines. Id. The consent decree provided that Deka would "make the
necessary repairs by certain dates," and in return HPD would relinquish its
rights to seek penalties for the prior violations. Id. The decree further provided
that "each housing code violation which Deka was required to cure would be
treated as the subject of a separate order of the court." Id.
90. Id. As stipulated by the consent decree, "fines were imposed for each
day that each violation went uncorrected ... "Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The appellate term, citing a United States Supreme Court decision,
emphasized that "civil contempt fines must be remedial [and not punitive] in
nature." Id. at 43, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 841 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)). The appellate term further noted that "[t]he
award should be formulated not to punish an offender, but solely to
compensate or indemnify private complainants." Id. (citing State v. Unique
Ideas, 44 N.Y.2d 345, 349, 376 N.E.2d 1301, 1304, 405 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658
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appellate division on the issue of the appellate term's reduction of
contempt fines and civil penalties.
The first constitutional issue addressed by the appellate division

was whether Deka had a right to a trial by jury, given that the
contempt fines assessed against it were allegedly severe in
nature. 93 The court began its reasoning

with the "well

established" proposition that "a jury trial must be made available
contempt
criminal
cases ... however, [that right] is not applicable to those criminal
contempts classified as petty offenses."94 The imposition of fines
for criminal contempt, unaccompanied by imprisonment, may

upon

demand

in

all

serious

(1978)). As to the question of whether the criminal contempt fines were
properly assessed, the court held that HPD's calculation was improper because
it bore "no legitimate relationship to the underlying statutory aim," which is to
"vindicat[e] the court's authority." Id. at 45, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
93. Id. at 46, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43 (stating the general rule that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 2 of
the New York Constitution guarantee the right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions") (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
94. Id. at 46, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968)). The court noted that the initial test to distinguish petty from serious
offenses was whether the defendant faced six months or more injail. Id. at 46,
620 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citing Codispotti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512
(1974)); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1969)). However, the court noted that in a subsequent
case, the United States Supreme Court "suggested that the determination [of
whether an offense was to be considered serious or petty] depended on the
magnitude of the deprivation under the circumstances of the case." Id. at 47,
620 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citing Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975)).
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas resolved the question of whether a charge
of contempt may be considered serious even if no jail time is imposed. 489
U.S. 538, 539 (1989). The Deka court noted that the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Blanton established that "the right to a jury trial did not
depend solely on the length of any jail sentence imposed, but rather included a
consideration of the seriousness of other punishments attached to the offense."
Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 47, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 837. The Deka court further noted
that the United States Supreme Court held in International Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), that incarceration for a
given period is not the only test of whether a criminal contempt charge is
sufficiently serious to engender a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Deka,
208 A.D.2d at 47, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
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evoke the Sixth Amendment right 95 to trial by jury if (1) the fines
97
are serious, 96 and (2) a jury trial is demanded.
The Deka court considered two factors in determining whether
a monetary sanction may give rise to a right to trial by jury: 98
Firstly, it must be determined whether the sanction sought to be
imposed is of a civil or criminal nature. Civil contempts
The second
engender no right to a jury trial ....
consideration.., is whether the amount of the fine rises to a
level where it is considered to be a serious sanction. The right to
trial by jury applies only to serious criminal sanctions; thus
courts may still impose noncompensatory petty fines for
contempts without conducting a jury trial. 9 9

As to the first consideration, Deka argued that even though some
of the contempt penalties were characterized as "civil" by HUD,
they in fact were punitive in nature, thus invoking a constitutional
right to a jury trial. 10 0 The court rejected this argument, stating
that "[t]here has been no showing by Deka of any civil penalty
provision that has been held to be sufficiently criminal in nature
so as to invoke the protections of the Sixth Amendment." 10 1
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96. See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2554.
97. Id.
98. See Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 47-49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 843-45.
99. Id. at 47-48, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 843-44 (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488, 495 (1974)). The Deka court explained that in determining whether
a fine is civil or criminal in nature, "[ilt is the substance of the proceeding and
the character of the relief that is critical and controlling." Id. at 48, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 844.
100. Id. at 49-50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
101. Id. at 50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845. Deka had relied on the following cases
in its argument: United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Hick v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Steve Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr "Iceman"
Malito v. Thorn Ruda Radda Rotor Rooter Schubert Salzer Maschinfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft "Rasta" Rademaker, 903 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Securities Exch. Comm. v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.
1982); and Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The court, on the other hand, relied on United States v. J.B. William
Co., 498 F.2d. 414 (2d Cir. 1974), in which civil penalties were not
characterized as sufficiently punitive in nature so as to invoke the right to a
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Deka argued that the court should adopt the reasoning employed
in United States v. Halper,1 o 2 where the Supreme Court raised
the possibility "that a given civil penalty, if punitive, could
engender additional constitutional protections." 103 It failed,
however, to offer any substantive arguments to show that the
penalties assessed against it were punitive in nature10 4 and this
was the primary reason why the argument was rejected. 105
As to the second consideration of whether the magnitude of the
fine constituted a "serious" penalty, the court stated that
"[f]ederal circuit courts, in addressing th[e] issue, have found
that a broad spectrum of monetary sanctions constitute serious
fmees." 106 Whether a fine will be considered serious may depend
on the amount of the fine gauged against "the defendant's ability

jury trial. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 50 n.5, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845 n.5. The court
also rejected Deka's reliance on United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),
by declining to extend that Court's holding that "imposition of a civil penalty
provision under the Federal False Claims Act against a defendant who had
been convicted and sentenced in a prior criminal trial constituted a violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause" to apply to the issue of whether civil contempt
penalties may invoke a constitutional right to a jury trial. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at
50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
102. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a statutory penalty authorizing
recovery which bore no "rational relation" to the sum of the Government's
actual loss in an action under the federal civil False Claim Act for Medicare
fraud constituted "punishment" in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution).
103. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The court noted that
"in Tull v. United States [481 U.S. 41 (1987)], the Supreme Court held that
when civil penalties are sought, the Seventh Amendment requires that a
demand for a jury trial be granted. The Seventh Amendment, however, has
never been held applicable to the States." Id. at 51 n.6, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846
n.6.
104. Id. at 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
105. Id. at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
106. Id. at 48, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (citing United States v. Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that a $5,000
fine imposed on union president entitled him to a jury trial)); United States v.
McAlister, 630 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that an individual facing a
$1,000 fine was entitled to a jury trial); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
543 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
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to pay." 107 Since Deka had "failed to introduce into evidence any
financial data or other records," 108 it was not possible for the
court to determine whether the criminal contempt fine was
serious enough to evoke a constitutional right to a jury trial. 109
Deka relied on United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 110 which held that where a fine of $100,000 or more is
imposed upon a corporation, it is entitled to a jury trial regardless
of its financial resources. 111 In the instant case, if the fines and

penalties imposed (including those labeled civil as well as those
labeled criminal) were considered in sum, they would have
amounted to more than $100,000.112 Deka reasoned that because

the sum could potentially exceed $100,000, it was entitled to a
jury trial. 11 3 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that (1)
the criminal contempt fines had already been reduced by the
appellate term and were not an issue on remand; 114 (2) the civil

contempt fines and penalties, being "compensatory and not
punitive in nature, I dot] not permit the invocation of a right to
trial by jury under either the Sixth Amendment or under Article
I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution." 115
The Appellate Term, Second Department, seemed to adopt the
federal "magnitude of the deprivation" analysis to determine
whether a monetary sanction was sufficiently serious to engender
107. Id. (citing United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding that a contempt fine of $80,000 was not serious when
measured against the defendant's ability to pay)).
108. Id. at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
109. Id. (citing New York State Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1353 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] contemner's failure to provide financial
information upon which the burden of a sanction may be evaluated may not be
charged... against the [petitioner] or result in a holding that the court abused
its discretion in imposing the sanction")), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
110. 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989).
111. Id. at 658.
112. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844-45. The court noted
that "HPD still demands a total of $313,695 in punitive contempt fines and
penalties ($53,000 in criminal contempt fines, S13,250 in civil contempt fines,
and $247,445 in civil penalties)." Id.
113. Id. at 49-50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
114. Id. at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
115. Id.
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a right to trial by jury. 116 The court noted approvingly that "in
many of the [federal] cases, the right to a jury trial was gauged
on the defendant's ability to pay." 117 However, as Deka failed to
provide information about its financial situation, the court refused
to determine whether the fines imposed in this circumstance were
"serious." 118 The court rejected the argument that the civil
penalties imposed were punitive in nature, as Deka failed to cite a
single federal case in which civil penalties were held to be
sufficiently punitive so as to give rise to a constitutional right to a
jury trial. 119 The court seemed willing to consider in the future
the possibility raised by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Halper120 that "a given civil penalty, if punitive,
could engender additional constitutional protections," 12 1 but
refused to do so at this time. Given that the issue of civil
contempt fines had been remitted for a determination of "'actual
damages' suffered by the tenants," 122 and that such fines would,
therefore, be "compensatory and not punitive in nature," the
court held that Deka did not have the right to a jury trial. 123
The second constitutional issued raised was whether "the
requirement of a written waiver of the right to a jury trial under
Article I, section 2 of the New York Constitution applies to a
civil action in which punitive sanctions are imposed." 124 The
court rejected Deka's argument that a written waiver was
required, noting that "[i]t is well settled that applications seeking
the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions arising out of a
civil action constitute a civil special proceeding to which the rules
of civil procedure governing jury demands apply." 125 New York

116. Id. at 47, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
117. Id. at 48, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 844.

119. Id. at 50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 50, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
Id. at 49, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
Id.
Id. at 40, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 839.

125. Id. at 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846 (citations omitted).
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Iiii

Civil Practice Law and Rules sections 410126 and 4102(a) 127

require that a jury demand be made in a timely manner, and that
failure to make such a demand will result in a waiver of such
right. 12 8 Deka, by failing to demand a jury trial, waived its
right. 129 The court rejected Deka's contention that the New York
Constitution requirement of a written waiver 130 was applicable
here, determining that provision applies only to "criminal
cases." 131 It reasoned that "[tihe procedural safeguards contained
therein were intended solely for criminal prosecutions," 132 and

as this case was not a criminal prosecution but a civil proceeding,
13 3
the provision did not apply.

The federal courts require a right to a jury trial in all serious
criminal contempt cases, but do not extend that right to petty
134
criminal contempt cases, or civil contempt cases.
Distinguishing between the types of criminal contempt was
initially achieved by classifying serious crimes as any crime
13 5
which carried a sentence of more than six months in jail.

However, incarceration is no longer the sole test used by federal
126. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 410 (McKinney 1995). Section 410
provides:
If triable issues of fact are raised they shall be tried forthwith and the
court shall make a final determination thereon. If issue are triable of
right by jury, the court shall give the parties an opportunity to demand a
jury trial of such issues. Failure to make such demand within the time
limited by the court, or, if no such time is limited, before trial begins,
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to trial by jury.
Id.
127. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 4102 (McKinney 1995). Section 4102
provides on pertinent part: "(a) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by
jury of any issue of fact triable by a jury .... If no party shall demand a trial
by jury as provided herein, the right to trial by jury shall be deemed waived by
all parties." Id.
128. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
129. Id.
130. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.

131. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 52, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-205 (1968); see also Taylor
v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
135. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974).
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courts to determine whether a crime is petty or serious. 136 In
addition, the Supreme Court has held that "the magnitude of the
deprivation under the circumstances of the case" should also be
evaluated to decide whether the criminal offense is petty or
serious. 137 The Supreme Court has held, however, that civil fines
which are found to be punitive in nature may give rise to further
constitutional protections. 138 The Deka court noted, however,
that Halper should be limited to its facts. 139 Nevertheless, the
court added that the decision had seriously raised the possibility
of a right to a jury trial under certain circumstances in a civil
proceeding. 140 As the Deka court apparently illustrates by
structuring its discussion around Supreme Court cases, New
York adheres to precedent set out under the Federal Constitution
concerning the right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings.

136. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 47, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 843.

137. Id. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); see also
International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.
2552 (1994); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). See
supra note 94.
138. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
139. Deka, 208 A.D.2d at 50-51, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
140. Id.
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